This paper develops a method for understanding the system-wide impact, measured in delay, of arrival and departure capacity constraints at 34 major airports in the United States. Capacity constraints at airports limit departures and arrivals, consequently delays accrue. Baseline arrival and departure rates at these airports were determined by analyzing four months of data. In addition to the most often used arrival and departure rates, reduced arrival and departure rates were also obtained from the four months of data. Both the baseline and the reduced airport arrival and departure rates were used as constraints for computing system-wide delays. Airport arrival and departure rates were changed at each airport, one at a time, to determine the effect of such changes on the arrival and departure delays at the other airports. Results of one hundred and three simulations are given as sensitivity matrices. These matrices describe the impact of arrival or departure capacity reduction at each of these airports on the arrival and departure delays at other major airports in the continental United States.
I. Introduction
s departure and arrival capacities are reduced at an airport, fewer aircraft depart and arrive at that airport. Aircraft are delayed prior to takeoff both due to departure restrictions at the airports of origin and due to arrival restrictions at the airports of destination. For example, air traffic management initiatives such as ground delay programs moderate arrival demand in response to reduced landing capacity at an airport by delaying in-bound flights at their airports of origin. In addition, airlines operate a hub-and-spoke network in which flights arriving from one airport are flown out to different destinations. This connectivity between flights causes departure or arrival delays at one airport to impact delays at other airports.
An approach similar to the one used for studying the sensitivity of delays at one airport on another, discussed in this paper, is described in Ref. 1 . The study in Ref. 1 determined the benefits of airport capacity enhancing technologies. The benefits were measured in terms of delay savings using a simulation in which the airports and sectors were modeled as nodes of a node-link network. Ref. 1 did not attempt to determine how airport capacity changes at one airport affect delays at the other airports. This paper is devoted to quantifying how delay at one of the 34 major airports in the United States affects the departure and arrival delays at the other major airports in the United States. The method for determining the impact of capacity reduction at one airport on the other airports consists of using the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Airspace Concept Evaluation System (ACES). Baseline and reduced airport departure and arrival capacities were obtained by analyzing four-months of Aviation System Performance Metrics (ASPM) data. A series of ACES simulations with baseline and reduced capacities were performed that showed the effect of capacity reduction at one airport on the other major airports.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the method for determining the affect of capacity reduction at one airport on the delays at the other airports. Section III presents the inputs needed for conducting ACES simulations. This includes determination of baseline and reduced airport departure and arrival capacities, and data conditioning steps. Results obtained using the baseline and reduced airport capacities via 103 ACES simulations are discussed in Section IV. The paper is summarized in Section V.
III. Simulation Inputs and Outputs
Input for ACES simulations consists of scenario files containing capacity data (airport arrival and departure capacities, and sector capacities), traffic data (scheduled departure times and flight-plans), and adaptation data (sector/center geometric data). These inputs are described below. Delay metrics, the outputs of ACES, are defined in this section.
A. Airport Capacities
To determine airport departure and arrival capacities, four-months of data spanning the period from March 1, 2006 through June 30, 2006 reported in the FAA's Aviation System Performance Metrics (ASPM) database were collected. This database can be accessed via the web site: http://www.apo.data.faa.gov/. Airport capacity data for a particular airport can be obtained by selecting the Analysis tab and choosing Airport, Weather and Hourly radio buttons on the graphical user interface. Table 1 shows the airport capacity data for Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International airport during each hour of March 17, 2006. The first column shows the local hour and the second column lists the landing and takeoff conditions at that hour. Instrument approach condition is indicated by IA and visual approach condition by VA. The airport departure rate (ADR), which is the number of takeoffs per hour, is tabulated in the third column. The airport arrival rate (AAR), which is the number of landings per hour, is listed in the fourth column of the table. Finally, the total capacity of the airport, which is the sum of the ADR and AAR, is given in the last column of the table. In addition to the items in Table 1 , the airport capacity data contain the actual number of arrivals and departures during the hour, cloud-ceiling, visibility, temperature, windspeed, wind-angle and arrival and departure runway configurations.
Baseline Capacities
The data of the type listed in Table 1 were analyzed via scripts written in the Matlab language 5 to determine the most frequently used total capacities, along with the associated arrival and departure capacities, for each of the 74 ASPM airports including the 34 OEP airports. Honolulu International airport, which is one of the 35 OEP airports, was excluded from analysis because this study is devoted to airports within the continental United States.
After obtaining the most frequently assigned total capacity -mode capacity from the entire dataset, instances with total capacities equal to the selected mode capacity were placed in a subset. Departure and arrival capacities American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 3 were then selected from this subset based on the minimum of the cost function given in Eq. (1):
is the airport departure rate and AAR C is the airport arrival rate. Observe that a minimum value of the function is obtained when the ADR is equal to the AAR. Table 2 
Reduced Capacities
Matlab scripts were also used to identify instances where total capacities, Total C , were close to 50% of the baseline capacities, Mode C , listed in Table 2 . The desire was to identify instances in real data when ADR and AAR were severely reduced. The ADR and AAR values corresponding to 50% capacities were obtained based on the minimum of Eq. (2):
These ADR and AAR values for the 34 OEP airports are listed in Table 3 . This second set consists of the reduced airport departure and arrival capacities that were used in ACES simulations for comparisons against the baseline capacities listed in Table 2 . Note that the reduced total capacities are not exactly 50% of the mode capacity; they are as close to 50% as possible based on the actual four-months of airport capacity data that were analyzed. For example, the reduced total capacity of Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport (KCVG) in Table 3 is 69% of the baseline total capacity of 156 aircraft/hour in Table 2 .
B. Flight-Plans and Adaptation Data
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C. Flight Schedule and Connectivity
The flight connectivity data, data conditioning steps and delay metrics are described in this section.
Flight Connectivity Data
Flight connectivity data relating the same physical aircraft to two or more flights segments were obtained from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) for the two days. Airline flightnumbers were used as tail-numbers for flights not found in the BTS data. The airline flight-numbers, aircraft tailnumbers and the associated flight-plans for all the flights were then included in the Flight Data Set (FDS) file.
The subsequent step consists of assigning a departure time to the flights in the FDS file. Scheduled departure times derived from the BTS data are assigned to the flights in the FDS file found in the BTS data. For flights that are not in the BTS data, proposed departure times from flight-plan messages in the ASDI data are assigned as scheduled departure times. In instances when the route of flight is available but the departure time is not, average taxi times reported in the FAA's Aviation System Performance Metrics (ASPM) database are subtracted from the departure message times reported in the ASDI data to estimate the gate departure times. Scheduled departure times are then set to these gate departure times.
After assigning a scheduled departure time for every flight, an ACES simulation is run without airport and sector capacity constraints to compute the unconstrained arrival time of each flight at its destination airport. These computed arrival times are then used as scheduled arrival times at the destination airports of the flights.
Data Conditioning
Data conditioning steps are needed to compensate for missing and incomplete data. Although the data conditioning steps taken introduce some errors in the simulation, they help keep most flights in the simulation. Errors are due to discrepancies between the airline flight schedule and the simulated flight schedule Although departure schedules are provided as ACES input, arrival schedules for the flights are created during the configuration step of ACES. These computed arrival times need to be earlier than the scheduled departure times of the next segment of the flights. Data in the initial FDS file are therefore processed further to ensure that flight connectivity is preserved and that the arrival and departure schedules linked to the same physical aircraft account for the turn-around-time. Figure 1 . Block diagram of the process for checking flight connectivity and turn-around-times.
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Turn-around-time is defined as the time required for unloading the aircraft after arrival at the gate and preparing it for departure. Turn-around-time was assumed to be 40-minutes irrespective of the size of the aircraft. The procedure for checking flight connectivity and turnaround-times is summarized in Fig. 1 . The process is begun by running an ACES simulation with the initial FDS file and storing the results in the output database. The output database is examined to retrieve flights with a common tail-number. These flights are sorted in time and then a check is performed to determine if the destination airport of the previous flight segment is the same as the origin of the next segment. If the check fails, a new tailnumber is assigned to the subsequent flight segments. For example, consider the four flight segments in Table 5 . Since the first segment of the flight ends at Los Angles International (KLAX) and the next segment begins at KLAX, these two segments are proper. The third segment starts at Chicago O'Hare International (KORD) which indicates that the flight connectivity between the second and the third leg is broken. A new tail-number, N12345-1, is assigned in the FDS file to associate this flight with a different aircraft. Tail-numbers of the subsequent segments are also altered. This means that the tail-number of the fourth segment in Table 5 is also altered to N12345-1 because it shares its airport of origin with the airport of destination of segment three.
Next, the scheduled arrival and departure times of the flight segments are examined to determine if there is adequate turn-around-time between the segments. If sa t is the scheduled arrival time of the previous segment, sd t is the scheduled departure time of the next segment and tat t is the required turn-around-time, it is expected that tat sa sd
If it is determined that the condition described by Eq. (3) is not met, the scheduled departure time is altered to meet the condition. The amount of change in the departure time also appears in the scheduled time of arrival of this flight segment at the next airport. Since the unimpeded flight time between a pair of origin-destination airports is a constant, a change in departure schedule alters the arrival schedule by the same amount. Once the schedule of a flight segment is altered, schedules of subsequent flight segments are also altered to ensure that the turn-around-time requirement is met.
The process summarized in Fig. 1 was applied to the initial FDS file that contained data for 98,674 flights operating out of 2,669 U. S. and foreign airports that were operated during the 48-hour period from March 17 th to the 18 th . Flight schedules and tail-numbers were altered for 37,638 flights to create the modified FDS file.
D. Selection of Time Periods for Capacity Reduction
Since the system-wide impact is a function of the time of day when ADR or AAR is reduced, peak-demand times were identified for each airport. A three-hour period around the peak demand time was identified as the time for ADR and AAR reduction at each airport. These times are provided in Table 6 . The second and seventh columns list the two dates -3/17/2006 and 3/18/2006 associated with start-times and end-times for reduction of the ADR and AAR values.
E. Delay Metrics
The delay metrics described below are ACES outputs that have been used for the study described in this paper. Scheduled times are employed in the simulation to provide the datum for computation of delays. Delays associated with the departure and arrival, which are defined below, are computed as those in Ref. 3 . Scheduled takeoff time, stt t , is defined as: 
where agdt t is the actual gate departure time and atot t is the actual taxi-out time. Actual times are not real ones but simulated times. Departure delay is then obtained as:
Scheduled gate arrival time, sgat t , is defined as: 
Substituting Eqs. (7) and (8) in Eq. (9) and using the definition in Eq. (6), it is seen that
Equation (10) shows that the departure delay is accounted as part of the arrival delay. Arrival delay can be reduced by absorbing a part of the departure delay in flight. These metrics were computed with the baseline and reduced airport capacities to study the system-wide impact of capacity reduction at the 34 OEP airports. Results of this study are discussed in the next section.
IV. Results
Results obtained via ACES simulations with baseline capacities are described in Subsection A and those obtained using reduced capacities are discussed in Subsection B.
A. Baseline Capacity Results
A simulation was conducted with the conditioned FDS file, baseline sector capacities and baseline airport departure and arrival capacities listed in Table 2 .
Aircraft-counts in each sector resulting from the baseline ACES simulation were retrieved from the output database and added together to compute the total number of aircraft in the continental United States above 10,000 feet altitude at one-minute intervals. This time history of aircraft count was then compared with the time history of the actual number of flights, above 10,000 feet altitude. Actual flights for those days, recorded in the ASDI data, were processed using NASA's Future ATM Concepts Evaluation Tool (FACET). 9 The two time histories are shown in Fig. 2 . Observe that the ACES simulation starts with all aircraft on the ground, whereas in the actual air traffic system there are always flights that are airborne. Figure 2 shows that the simulated traffic catches up with the actual traffic around four UTC. The general trend of the simulated traffic is similar to the actual traffic for the twenty-four hours between eight UTC on 17 March 2006 and eight UTC on 18 March 2006 (location marked 32 UTC in Fig. 2) .
Differences between the time histories are both due to issues with the actual flight data and with the simulation. Several issues related to the quality of ASDI data are described in Ref. 10 . These issues make it difficult to exactly determine how many flights are in the airspace at a given instant of time. Flight-plan amendments, cancellations and pop-up flights are not included in the simulation. Flights with track information but missing flight-plans in ASDI data are not included in the simulation. Additionally, the trajectory flown by the real aircraft can be different than the one synthesized in the simulation.
During the simulation, aircraft were delayed on the ground and in the air to ensure that the airport and sector capacities were not exceeded. Figure 3 shows the baseline ADR value of 96, scheduled takeoff demand and the achieved takeoff rate at the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta airport as a function of time. The time along the abscissa is with respect to 17 March 2006, 0:00 UTC. The dashed line shows the baseline ADR value. The scheduled demand is shown with a solid-line marked with crosses (x) and the achieved departure rate, measured as the number of aircraft that departed in one-hour time period, is shown with another solid-line marked with circles (o). Observe that the scheduled demand was greater than the ADR value, whereas the achieved ('actual') departure rate is close to the ADR value. Comparing the scheduled demand and the achieved rate graphs in Fig. 3 between the locations marked as 28 UTC and 32 UTC, it is seen that the excess demand is modulated by shifting the flights to later times. Actual departure rates beyond 44:00 UTC should be ignored because departed flights that did not reach their destination airports prior to termination of the simulation were not counted. The arrival rate was also controlled in ACES to guarantee that the baseline AAR capacities are not exceeded. Figure 4 shows the baseline AAR value of 96, scheduled arrival demand and the achieved arrival rate at the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta airport. Observe that the arrival rate constraint was also met by delaying flights, which is reflected in the duration of the achieved arrival rate being close to the AAR value.
It should be noted that most of the arrival delays are realized prior to departure at the departure airport and minimally in the airborne phase. In this sense, delays are mostly realized (imposed) at airports of origin both for ADR constraints at airports of origin and AAR constraints at the airports of destination. This is also the way most of the delays occur in the real air traffic system. For example, controlled departure times are issued at airports of origin during a Ground Delay Program at a destination airport.
The values of dd t and gad t for each of the 34 OEP airports were obtained from the ACES baseline simulation. Table 7 lists these values along with the number of aircraft that departed from and arrived at each airport and the number of aircraft that landed at each airport during the twenty-four hour period spanning from eight UTC on 17 March 2006 to eight UTC on 18 March 2006 (location marked as 32 UTC in Fig. 2 ). Columns one and six list the airports. Departure-counts are listed in columns two and seven, and the total departure delays in minutes obtained by summing the departure delays of aircraft delayed by 15-minutes or more are given in columns three and eight. This 15-minutes delay metric is commonly used by the FAA for assessing the performance of the air traffic system. Arrival-counts are provided in columns four and nine, and the total arrival delays in minutes obtained as the sum of arrival delays of aircraft delayed by 15-minutes or more are listed in columns five and ten. It should be noted that the delays in Table 7 cannot be compared with the OPSNET delays given in Table 4 because of their definitions. Delays in ACES are compared against schedule, whereas delays in OPSNET are compared with respect to the time when pilot requests permission to depart. In ACES, once a flight incurs departure delay, it can continue to incur departure delays as it arrives and departs from other airports. In the real system, it is possible that departure delay is only accounted once. Delays would not accrue in subsequent flight segments, if the air traffic controller permits the flight to depart soon after departure request is made by the pilot.
Departure delay per flight is obtained as the ratio of the total departure delays to the departure-counts and the arrival delay per flight is obtained as the ratio of the total arrival delays to the arrival-counts. These ratios, obtained using the data in Table 7 , are shown in Fig. 5 . This figure shows that Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International (KATL) flights experience the most departure and arrival delays. One of the reasons is apparent from Fig. 3 , which shows that the ratio of peak departure demand to departure capacity is 1.7. For comparison, Chicago O'Hare (KORD), which has similar ADR and AAR values as Atlanta, has a peak departure demand to capacity ratio of 1.1. Flights departing from George Bush Intercontinental/Houston Airport (KIAH) and flights arriving at Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood International (KFLL) also experience significant delays. The large difference between departure delay and arrival delay at KIAH is due to low ADR of 56 aircraft per hour compared to the high AAR of 120 aircraft per hour (see Table 2 ). Figure 6 . Departure rate achieved at HartsfieldJackson Atlanta airport with reduced ADR.
B. Reduced Capacity Results
One-hundred-and-two ACES simulations were conducted with reduced ADR and AAR capacities listed in Table 3 for the time-durations given in Table 6 . The baseline ADR and AAR values for the non-OEP airports listed in Table 2 were kept for all the simulations, only the values for OEP airports were altered for the sensitivity study. The first set of 34 ACES simulations were conducted by changing the ADR value for each OEP airport one at a time, while keeping the baseline ADR values for the other airports. The baseline AAR values for all OEP airports were kept for this set of simulations. Figure 6 shows an example of the achieved departure rate in response to ADR reduction at the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta airport from the baseline rate of 96 aircraft per hour to 48 aircraft per hour during 13:00 UTC through 16:00 UTC. The dashed-line in the graph shows the ADR value and the solid-line marked with circles shows the achieved rate. The scheduled departure demand is shown by the solid-line marked with crosses.
The impact of the ADR reduction at Atlanta airport on the departure and arrival delays at the other airports is shown in Fig. 7 . This figure shows the percentage increase or decrease in the delay values compared to the baseline delay values at those airports, which are given in columns three, five, eight and ten of Table 7 . A key observation is that as departure delays at Atlanta increase, arrival delays at the other airports also increase. This is an expected result based on Eq. (10); it is interesting that the departure delays at some of the airports increase. This effect is explained by the fact that departures from these airports are connected to arrivals from Atlanta. The same physical aircraft arriving from Atlanta is flown out of these airports to other out-bound destinations. An arrival delay associated with these flights shows up as departure delay for the connected out-bound flights. Finally, one observes that the arrival delays also increase at Atlanta although the AAR values were not changed. This again is due to delayed departures from airports that depart aircraft for Atlanta.
The impact of ADR reduction at each of the 34 OEP airports on the departure delays at other OEP airports is summarized in Table 8 . The first column of this table lists the airport whose ADR was reduced and the header row indicates the impacted airport. A value of 89 in the first element of the first row states that total departure delay of flights delayed by 15-minutes or more at Atlanta increased by 89% compared to the baseline departure delay value of 151,897 minutes (see Table 7 ) due to reduced ADR at Atlanta. Similarly, the second element of the second row shows that the departure delay increased by 57% at Boston Logan airport due to reduced ADR at the Boston Logan airport. Note that the percentage values in the table have been rounded. Viewing Table 8 as a matrix, it is seen that the diagonal elements have a higher value compared to the off-diagonal terms. This is an expected result because ADR reduction at the airport directly affects departures from that airport. Closer examination reveals that for some of the airports, departure delays do not increase significantly with reduced ADR values. It was determined that for these airports, the departure demand is either lower or only slightly greater than the reduced ADR values. The only two airports -KMEM and KPHX for which the reduced ADR values were found to be same as the baseline values in the four months of operational data (see Tables 2 and 3) , additional departure delays were not expected.
The effect of ADR reduction on the arrival delays is shown in Table 9 . Viewing the data in Table 9 as a matrix, it is seen that the values of diagonal elements are low, which indicates that reduced ADR at an airport does not significantly increase arrival delays at that airport. Some airports -Atlanta (KATL), Houston (KIAH), John F. Kennedy (KJFK), San Francisco (KSFO) and Salt Lake City (KSLC) did not follow this trend. Reduced ADR at these airports had the effect of increasing arrival delays at these airports. Examining the rows of Table 9 , it is seen that the off-diagonal terms are large for some airports. For example, the value of 41 in the first row under the KDFW heading means that total delays of flights arriving at Dallas/Fort Worth (KDFW) that were delayed by fifteenminutes or more increased by 41% compared to the baseline value in Table 7 due to reduced ADR at Atlanta. Increase in arrival delay should be expected because the delay caused by ADR reduction at the airports of origin can be expected to be propagated to the airports of destination. The significance of increase in delay should be judged by comparing the baseline delay value for the airport against the baseline delay values of other airports, which are given 12 in Table 7 . For example, an increase of 50% in delays at Atlanta is considerably more significant compared to the same increase at Salt Lake City.
The next set of 34 ACES simulations were conducted with reduced AAR values at each of the 34 OEP airports. Baseline ADR values were kept for all the airports. Figure 8 shows the impact of AAR reduction at Atlanta on the other OEP airports. The bar-graphs show that the total arrival delay due to flights arriving late by fifteen-minutes or more increases by more than 90% compared to the baseline arrival delay in Table 7 . The figure shows that departure delays at several airports increase due to reduced AAR at Atlanta. This is to be expected because the arrival constraint at Atlanta is met by delaying the out-bound flights to Atlanta at their airports of origin. Arrival delay at Atlanta also contributes to departure delay at Atlanta due to in-bound out-bound flight connectivity. This departure delay then propagates as arrival delay at other airports. In some instances, the departure and arrival delays are reduced slightly at other airports. This is essentially due to shifting of the departure and arrival times of the affected flights to times of lower demand at these airports.
The results shown in both Figs. 7 and 8 demonstrate that the impact of capacity reduction at one airport on the delays at another airport is complicated because of network (flight-connectivity) effects. Mathematical modeling of these effects is difficult, and therefore, a simulation capability like ACES is required for such an analysis.
The impact of reduction of AAR at each airport on the departure delays at 34 OEP airports is summarized in Table 10 . Data trends in this table are similar to those seen in Fig. 8 . It should be noted that departure delays at La Guardia (KLGA), Minneapolis-Saint Paul (KMSP), Chicago O'Hare (KORD), San Francisco (KSFO) and Salt Lake City (KSLC) increase significantly due to their own reduced AAR rates.
The sensitivity of arrival delays at the 34 OEP airports to reduced AAR at other airports is summarized in Table  11 . This table shows that the reducing AAR at the airports, increases arrival delays significantly. Delays increase by more than 100% at Cleveland-Hopkins (KCLE), Charlotte/Douglas (KCLT), Newark Liberty (KEWR), Washington Dulles (KIAD), John F Kennedy (KJFK), La Guardia (KLGA), Minneapolis-Saint Paul (KMSP), Chicago O'Hare (KORD), Philadelphia (KPHL), Phoenix Sky Harbor (KPHX) and Salt Lake City (KSLC). The off-diagonal terms show that arrival delays also increase considerably at some airports due to AAR reduction at other airports. Instances are also seen where arrival delays decrease by a small amount. Table 9 . Impact of ADR reduction at one airport on arrival delays at other OEP airports . 34  26  35  36  27  41  27  10  6  21  13  5  5  14  KBOS  0  2  3  1  1  0  6  0  0  2  2  1  2  0  6  -1  1  KBWI  0  0  -1  0  1 1  0  1 40  56  15  28  9  13  19  4  28  12  13  5  26  27  29  KBOS  2  2  1  2  1  0  2  1  2  0  2 1  1  4  4  1  5  6  4  1  3  2  8  5  2  5  6  2  KORD  4  1  0  8  3  11  2  10  5  3  8  13  13  3  5  13  6  KPDX  1  0  0  10  -1  -3  0  4  -1  1  4  5  13  2  -1  0  -1  KPHL  2  3  3  7  1  5  7  3  5  2  8  3  1 The final set of 34 ACES simulations were conducted with both ADR and AAR reduced together at each airport, one at a time, while keeping baseline ADR and AAR values at the other airports to complete the sensitivity study. Tables 12 and 13 summarize these results. Table 12 presents the impact on departure delays at the 34 OEP airports and Table 13 shows the impact on arrival delays. Both these tables show that the departure and arrival delays increase substantially at the airports were capacity is reduced. Other observations made in the previous tables remain the same for these tables too.
The data presented in Tables 12 and 13 show that the percentage change in departure and arrival delays at the affected airports due to both reduced ADR and AAR capacities is close to the maximum of delay change due to reduced ADR capacities or AAR capacities given in Tables 8 through 11 . For example, departure delay increase of 93% at Dallas Fort Worth (KDFW) due to both ADR and AAR reduction at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta (KATL) (see Table 12 ) is closer to 85% increase in departure delays due AAR reduction at KATL (see Table 10 ) compared to 39% increase in departure delays due ADR reduction at KATL (see Table 8 ). These initial results show that it might not be possible to simply add the impact due to ADR capacity reduction to that due to AAR reduction to derive the combined impact of both ADR and AAR capacity reduction. The utility of the sensitivity data in Tables 8 through  13 for developing delay forecasting models remains to be seen. The results also provide insight into flight demand between pairs of airports. For example, the impact of capacity reduction at Atlanta on delays at Dallas Fort Worth (KDFW) is much more compared to those at San Francisco International (KSFO). This insight can also be gained by analyzing origin-destination pairs in the ACES FDS file.
System-wide impact due to each airport is easily determined by first using the percent change in delays given in the rows of Tables 8 through 13 with the baseline delay values reported in Table 7 for determination of delay increase or decrease at each affected airport, and then adding these delay values. Figure 9 shows the increase in system-wide departure delays due to ADR and AAR reduction, obtained using the values in Table 12 . Figure 10 depicts the impact on system-wide arrival delays obtained using values in Table 13 . Both Figs. 9 and 10, show that capacity constraints at Atlanta, compared to constraints at other airports, have a significantly higher impact on the total system departure and arrival delays. One of the reasons is that there are significantly more flights with connected segments out of Atlanta compared to any other airport. Atlanta had 1,347 connected flights compared to 1,017 at Chicago, the airport with the next higher number of connected flights. In the real system the delays at Table 11 . Impact of AAR reduction at one airport on arrival delays at other OEP airports. 12  3  85  28  -1  14  27  7  -1  21  2  2  -6  5  KBOS  0  47  1  -1  0  0  0  2  0  0  -1  -1  0  0  3  -1  0  KBWI  0  1  6  2  2  0  -1  0  -3  1 9  24  32  5  13  0  12  KBOS  0  58  2  0  1  0  4  -3  0  2  0  1  1  0  3  1  0  KBWI  0  1  1  1  1  -1  0  0  -2  1  1  -2  -1  0  1  0  0  KCLE  0  1  1  34  1  2  1  0  1 0  1  24  1  0  358  20  10  1  0  5  4  5  0  5  21  0  KORD  4  0  -2  7  3  62  360  7  3  0  24  5  18  1  6  21  3  KPDX  0  -1  2  1  -2  1  0  148  0  0  0  4  3  3  -2  1  3  KPHL  4  3  7  -2  4  2  10  -3  82  0  23  0  0  -1  -1  3  2  KPHX  2  0  18  5  0  8  1  44  0  7  3  43  17  2  22  11  1 Table 13 . Impact of ADR and AAR reduction at one airport on arrival delays at other OEP airports.
